European company law.
Introduction
The twentieth anniversary of the important judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Centros case of 9 March 1999 is an opportunity to reassess this decision 1 and, more importantly, its impact on developments of freedom of establishment in the European Union. 2 This article has an overview character, presenting the issue of freedom of establishment and mobility of companies from the beginning of the European "adventure" and the development of regulatory arbitrage and regulatory competition in company law in the EU in the last twenty years. Prerequisites and Limits (Peter Lang, 2002) . 2 In this article the terms company and company law and corporation and corporate law are used with the same meaning. 3 The topic of freedom of establishment of companies in a context of possible regulatory arbitrage and regulatory competition has proved to be extensively studied in Europe with a burgeoning literature over the last twenty years. Limiting the overview to the literature in English and without any claims of exhaustiveness see e.g., Eva-Maria Kieninger, Indeed, contrary to the US benchmark model, in Europe the phenomenon of mobility of companies has involved almost exclusively close corporations and in particular private limited liability companies, with some sporadic exemptions related to listed companies. 5 Given this pattern, the analysis will show that, twenty years after Centros, the situation in the EU differs considerably from the United States. A US style market for corporate charters for listed corporations with dispersed ownership will probably not develop in Europe in the future. 6 The conclusion is that Centros had the positive effect of reconsidering the philosophy of harmonization of company law in Europe and making all the actors more aware of the pro and contra of such a device to reach the goal of an integrated internal market (Article 3.3 EU Treaty). 7 More importantly, Centros served as a very simple but at the same time very incisive device, decided by the ECJ as "motor of European integration",
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(i) to eradicate the very deep fears anchored on and defended by the real seat theory followed by some Member
States against "(EU)-foreign" companies, and as result (ii) to affirm the relevance of the country of origin principle and the mutual recognition principle, already applied in other areas of law, also in the field of company law. 9 The mentioned fears were exaggerated both with respect to the protection of shareholders and the protection of creditors and no longer justified in the European internal market context of Article 3.3 EU Treaty. This case has reconsidered the relationship between company law and insolvency law, making the regulatory picture at the same time easier but more difficult to evaluate.
12
In this context, also the extent to which Brexit will impact on freedom of establishment (and on insolvency proceedings) is dependent on the way the exit will materialize.
13
The liberal case law of the ECJ in the recent past accompanied by the economic and financial crisis after 2008 has led the European Commission to reconsider its action policy in the field of company law, which includes listed companies and close companies. 12 Kornhass concerned a UK limited liability company operating in Germany. The article in structured as follows. After providing in Section 2 a short overview of the relevant issues at stake in the case of freedom of establishment of companies in the European Community (Union), Section 3 briefly analyses the market for corporate charters for the United States for comparative purposes. Section 4 provides an overview of the development of the jurisprudence of the ECJ in the field of freedom of establishment and mobility of companies among Member States. Section 5 concentrates on a short assessment of the evolution of the European market for company law from the demand and supply side perspective. Section 6 concludes.
Freedom of establishment of companies in the EEC Treaty between incorporation theory and real seat theory
At the beginning of the European adventure, the relevant Articles in the area of freedom of establishment and mobility of companies were articles 52 To understand the major points of the more recent positive (re)evaluation of the Delaware predominance, it is useful to briefly describe the terms of the law and economics debate that developed in the United States.
, 27
Starting point for the analysis of the market for corporate charters is that the firm is an alternative mechanism for allocating resources than the market, owing to the different patterns of transaction costs that exist between the two mechanisms.
28
The corporation is considered to be a nexus of contracts between several parties (patrons) generating agency problems and agency costs. monopoly power, opportunistic behavior and asymmetric information) while ownership costs (meaning the residual right of control and the residual right of earning) include the costs of controlling managers, the costs of collective decision making and the costs of risk bearing.
32
Ownership of the firm is efficiently assigned to a particular group of patrons in a way that "minimizes the total costs of transactions between the firm and all of its patrons".
33
The business corporation is characterized by the efficient assignment of ownership to shareholders because this reduces the total transaction costs of the entire nexus.
34
In such a context, where the allocation of ownership to shareholders is justified in terms of better management control and common objective of shareholder value, the US market for corporate charters apparently reduces the costs of ownership and for this reason is efficient.
35
Indeed, the implicit logic of the US market for corporate charters is that a (re)incorporation to Delaware increases the value of the corporation, meaning that ownership costs are comparatively reduced.
36
At the same time, a (re)incorporation to Delaware a new company) and of reincorporation (i.e. change of applicable law of an existing company with retention of the legal personality), and the supply side.
The demand side
The demand side of the European market for corporate charters has mainly concerned in the last twenty years, first incorporations of private limited companies (or of closed corporations).
58
To analyze the possible efficiency gains of the European market for corporate charters, it is possible to scrutinize this result using the ownership costs vs contracting costs paradigm presented in Section 3. it can be presumably assumed that the European Union has gained in efficiency terms. This simply assumption is based on the elementary argument that the micro structure of the demand side of the ownership costs of (re)-incorporations has signaled this natural development.
A counter argument, rejecting this conclusion, should place the burden of proof of demonstrating, when choosing an alternative company law for (re)incorporations, shareholders of private limited companies would intentionally increase their ownership costs, so reducing the efficiency of their contractual agreement. Such an argument is of course difficult to sustain and would bring to the paternalistic policy conclusion that the hosting Member State B should impede the free choice of law of shareholders for Member State A.
Given this picture, we can reach a first, major comparative conclusion for differences in the structure of ownership costs between the US and the EU. In With regards to creditors, current ECJ case law is such that an efficient result is presumed in the case of both first incorporation and reincorporation.
Adopting the paradigm of analysis used in this article, taking into account also contracting costs, implies adding to the presumed average decrease of the ownership costs, either (i) the possible invariance of the costs of credit (i.e. the costs of credit do not change in case of (re)incorporation in a Member State different from the one where business is carried out) or (ii) their possible increase (i.e. the costs of credit do increase).
71
Depending on the results of this exercise, the total possible benefits or costs for the complex of (re)incorporations in the European internal market should emerge.
72
However, a complication in this exercise emerges because the regulatory arbitrage for saving in ownership costs has determined an apparent relaxation of legal capital rules for private limited companies in several Member States.
73
The extent to which this development has decreased or increased per se the costs of credit is nevertheless difficult to assess. 
about ECGI
The European Corporate Governance Institute has been established to improve corporate governance through fostering independent scientific research and related activities.
The ECGI will produce and disseminate high quality research while remaining close to the concerns and interests of corporate, financial and public policy makers. It will draw on the expertise of scholars from numerous countries and bring together a critical mass of expertise and interest to bear on this important subject.
The views expressed in this working paper are those of the authors, not those of the ECGI
